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This paper argues that exogenous changes in household income
alter the allocation of time within the family. To examine this
issue, we propose a theoretical framework that is an extension
of the unitary model of intra-household time allocation where
conditional cash transfers are received by the household and we
test it empirically using non-parametric techniques. This allows
us to study the effects of an exogenous shock, such as a conditional
cash transfer program, on time allocated to various activities
such as work, domestic labor, leisure, and school for children and
adults. Using the exogenous change of a conditional cash transfer
program in Colombia, ”Familias en Accion”, we find significant
positive effects on work time as well as on leisure and school
for children and smaller effects on adult schooling and domestic
labor, which support our hypothesis. These results are crucial
to fully understand other direct and indirect effects of the program.
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Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs have been implemented in many
developing countries in an effort to increase human capital and alleviate poverty.
These programs provide monetary grants to poor families on the condition that
the families keep their children in school and take them to regular visits to health
clinics. While these programs began in Latin America, they are currently used in
more than 40 countries around the world (World Bank, 2011). In trying to ac-
complish these objectives, CCT programs may affect beneficiary families in many
dimensions. These include the level and patterns of consumption, the health con-
ditions of family members, the investment in human and physical capital, and
the labor supply of children and adults. A number of studies have shown CCT
programs to be effective in increasing school enrollment, reducing child labor and,
as a consequence, reducing poverty (Fistbein et al, 2009; Attanasio, Fitzsimons,
Gomez, Lopez, Megir and Mesnard, 2006; Schultz, 2004). In addition, some liter-
ature has shown some unintended or indirect effects of CCT, such as an increase
in savings, change in sexual behavior, crime rate as well as political participation
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(Fistbein et al, 2009; Camacho et al, 2012).
To obtain CCTs’ direct and indirect effects, families have to modify their be-
havior at an intra-household level, affecting the time allocated to work, childcare,
as well as leisure. This fact has been overlooked in the existing literature despite
its importance. There are a number of reasons why intra-household time alloca-
tion is important, which can be enhanced (or attenuated) by the implementation
of CCTs, particularly in developing countries. First, economic agents (individ-
ual or household) in developing countries interact less through market activities
than economic agents in developed countries because households (in developing
countries) are generally self-sufficient in a number of dimensions. Second, intra-
household time is not equally distributed across members. As argued by Ilahi
(2000), there are significant differences not only by gender but also by age, social
status, wealth, etc. Today, there is extensive literature on the intra-household
allocation of resources in developing countries (see, for instance, Haddad et al.,
1997). Third, a significant part of the survival of poor households in developing
countries is achieved through home production and labor market activities. The
primary resource used to attain increased well-being is the time of the house-
hold members. At the same time, leisure (which is the opposite of work) is a
good that individuals obtain welfare from. Finally, and more importantly, devel-
opment policy interventions aimed at increasing well-being, such as safety nets,
basic services projects, and agricultural extension programs, can learn a lot from
information on time use. Whether or not some or all household members have
time constraints can have a crucial impact on the success of the projects (Ilahi,
2000). Thus, this paper aims to shed some light on the effects of income on
intra-household time allocation by providing information on the effects of CCT
programs on intra-household time allocation to various activities, such as market
work, domestic labor, school, and leisure for children and adults. To our knowl-
edge, evidence of the extent to which these transfers affect intra-household time
allocation is limited with evaluations in Mexico (Parker and Skoufias, 2000) and
Brazil (Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite, 2003); furthermore, evidence of the ex-
tent to which adult labor supply is affected is also quite scarce and weak (Cuesta,
2004; Foguel and Barros, 2009; Parker and Skoufias, 2000), mostly due to the lack
of good data on the time use of household members. The quasi-experimental de-
sign of the Familias en Accion (FA) program and the availability of panel data on
individual time allocation provide a great opportunity to analyze intra-household
time allocation in the context of policy intervention. Whether or not policy in-
terventions limit the time of some or all household members can have a crucial
impact on the success of the program and future well-being of the beneficiaries.
In principle, CCT programs can be considered as having both income and price
effects. The cash transfer increases household income, which in turn increases
both consumption and leisure and reduces the labor supply of all household mem-
bers. This effect is called the income effect. The price effect is associated with
meeting the conditions of the program. The condition on school attendance im-
plies a reduction in the shadow wage of children, which would result in an increase
in the amount of time that children spend in school relative to work. Induced
changes in the allocation of the childrens time are likely to lead to a reallocation of
the parents time. These are the cross-substitution effects. That is, if the children
become unable to perform certain work or domestic activities, other household
members (adults) may substitute to do their work. Therefore, the impact of the
CCT program on the time allocation of household members is ambiguous under
economic theory. We address this question with a simple theoretical model and
test it empirically, considering the substitution possibilities in the time that fam-
ily members use for household production, paid work, and leisure.
To empirically evaluate the effects, we used the Colombian CCT program “Fa-
milias en Accion” (FA), which has been operating since 2002, and rely on panel
data surveys particularly conducted to evaluate this program. Our data consist
of individual household-level information from municipalities that were included
in the program and others that were not. Between 2002 and 2005, one pre-
intervention and two follow-up survey instruments collected data on education,
labor, income, and health at individual, household, and community levels. Time-
use diary data were collected for all household members older than 10 years during
all three rounds. The availability of these data offers an extraordinary setting in
which to analyze time-allocation responses to exogenous changes in income.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on time
allocation. Section 3 discusses the hypothesis on the program effects within a
unitary theoretical model framework. Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and
the empirical strategy used in the analysis. Estimation results are presented in
Section 6, and Section 7 concludes.
I. Intrahousehold Time Allocation: A Review
The analysis of time use is essentially an analysis of the allocation of time to
various activities such as work for wages, work in the family business, domes-
tic chores, and school activities for children. Becker (1965) and Gronau (1977)
extended the conventional labor-supply model of consumption and leisure by in-
corporating home production as another labor activity. The authors argued that
work at home (or home production) will respond to economic incentives such as
changes in market wages, unearned income, and productivity in a way similar to
market work.
In the context of the determinants of intra-household time allocation, several
studies have econometrically addressed the effects of age, gender, household com-
position, market prices, and other variables on the time allocation of household
members. Ellis (1994) presented a good survey of descriptive studies on time-
allocation patterns in rural households in developing countries. The studies con-
sistently found that (a) compared to male time use, female time use is more
elastic with respect to her and her partners wage rates and the presence of young
children in the house; (b) roles and cultural norms are important determinants
of time use, and ignoring them introduces bias in time-use equations; and (c)
nonwage income deters labor force participation by raising reservation wages and
increasing the consumption of leisure.
Evidence of the cross-substitution effects between child labor and adult labor
supply is very scarce. Skoufias (1994) estimated the interrelationships among mar-
ket wage rates and the time allocated by adult male, adult female, and younger
household members to market work, home production, and schooling and found
that the wage rates of both adults and children are important determinants of
the time use of adults and children. From this study, it can be concluded that if
labor markets exist, there appears to be an association between adult and child
time, usually between the mother and the daughter. Thus, an increase in female
wages can increase the female labor supply to market activities and subsequently
pull girls into housework.
In spite of the existing literature on time allocation patterns of households,
there are some issues that still remain to be developed. First, few studies include
nonmarket activities, such as domestic labor, as dependent variables, and fewer
are still able to include the time men spend on household chores, primarily be-
cause of data limitations. Most of the studies focus only on the labor supply of
some household members, usually the men and women in the household. How-
ever, a large number of activities in developing countries occur at home; thus,
accounting for such activities is very important when we want to determine the
welfare of the household as a whole. Second, while there is evidence that house-
hold time is not equally distributed across members, there is still little evidence
on how the demographic composition by gender/age affects the time allocated to
market work, home production, and schooling. The effect of CCT programs on
children time allocation has been widely studied in literature. In general, CCT
programs have been successful at increasing school enrollment and reducing child
work. Frequently, these impacts have been concentrated among older children.
Schultz (2004) showed that the Progresa program in Mexico has a positive effect
on schooling and helps to reduce child work, particularly for boys, but it also
helps decrease domestic work for girls. In Nicaragua, the Red de Proteccion So-
cial (RPS) reduced child work by 3 to 5 percentage points among children aged
7 to 13 (Maluccio and Flores, 2005).
However, some evaluations have found no significant effect on child labor. For
example, an analysis of Bolsa Escola, a CCT program implemented in Brazil, finds
that the program has a big impact on increasing school enrollment but has no
influence on child labor (Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite, 2003; Cardoso Souza,
2004). Attanasio et al. (2006) found that FA has a positive effect on school
enrollment, particularly in older children, a negative effect on domestic work for
young children, and a neutral effect on income-generating work. In most cases,
there is evidence that the effect of CCT programs is much stronger on school than
on work and that child labor is usually increased at the expense of child leisure
rather than school enrollment. The effect of CCT programs on intra-household
time allocation has not been widely explored, although it has been recognized
that household is an important intermediary between aggregate policies and in-
dividuals and that any change in the constraints, technologies, or prices facing
the household will induce it to reallocate resources to conform to the optimized
allocation. Ardington, Case, and Hosegoods’s (2009) results from South Africa
indicate that transfers might affect even more complex within-household interac-
tions, inducing unexpected labor-supply responses. There might also be potential
heterogeneity in the effects in gender and age dimensions, among others. In prac-
tice, CCT programs appear to have been a modest disincentive or have had null
effects on adult work. Parker and Skoufias (2000) have used Progresa time-use
data to study the impacts of the intervention on adults’ time allocation. The
authors found significant effects of the program on female adults’ household work
but no effects on adults’ market labor supply. The data used by Edmonds and
Schady (2008) suggest that the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) program in
Ecuador had no effects on the adult labor supply. Only for Nicaragua, there is
some evidence of significant negative effects on adult work. Maluccio and Flores
(2005) showed that the RPS resulted in a significant reduction in hours worked
by adult men in the preceding week (by approximately six hours), with no effect
on adult women. The few significant impacts imply adjustments in the intensive
margin (hours) rather than in the extensive margin (participation).
II. Model
The theoretical basis to understand the intra-household decision-making pro-
cess of time allocation is formulated under the unitary model framework, which
considers a family as a rational agent who optimizes his utility subject to a com-
mon household restriction. The objective is to introduce quality childcare and
exogenous transfers into the family decision-making process and to analyze the
theoretical relationships between these transfers and the time allocation of the
family (labor supply and leisure time).
The unitary model establishes a utility function (eq.1), which represents the
family preferences when the household problem is to choose consumption (C)
and leisure (l) and each family members time spent with children (t) such that
the utility function is maximized. This function is subject to time restrictions
and the usual budget constraints. In this particular case, we consider a family as
composed of two parents (husband and wife) and one child.
The superscripts denotes husband (m), wife (f) and children (c). Equation (2)
is the budget constraint where θ(Qc) is the conditional cash transfer considering
the requirements to receive this additional income, which we suppose is a func-
tion of quality child care Qc. Equations (3) and (4) are time restrictions, where
T j(j = m, f, c) is the available time. The quality of childcare is a linear function
of each parents time spent with children (tf , tm) and private (tcc) or family child
care (to), Qc = tm + tf + δto + tcc. When family child care is available δ = 1
and zero otherwise. The parameters of the model must satisfy the restriction∑
i=m,f,c αj + βi = 1.
The available time spent with children has an additional term ec, that repre-
sents an entire scholar journey. c is a dummy variable that takes the value of
one if the child is attending school, and zero otherwise. The decision of school
attendance is not subject to the maximization problem of the household. This
decision (c value) can be interpreted as a function of household wages, non-wage
income and other prices such as the cost of schooling. Since we assume that these
prices are given for the family, we are not going to focus on this issue until we
examine the effects of θ that directly involve school attendance as a requirement
to receive this benefit.
(1) Max U =
∑
i=m,f,c
αiln
(
ci − γi)+ ∑
i=m,f,c
βiln
(
li
)
+ d1ln (Q
c)
Subject to:
(2)
∑
i=m,f,c
ci + pcctcc + poto = y +
∑
i=m,f,c
wihi + θ(Qc)
(3) Tm = lm + hm + tm
(4) T f = lf + hf + tf
(5) T c = lc + hc + ce
c
(6) T ch = tm + tf + to + tcc
To find a unique solution to this problem (given the perfect substitution as-
sumption implicit in the utility function), we assume that wm 6= {wm, wf , pcc, po}
and po = 0. Another important assumption is the exogeneity of θ( Qc) in the
decision-making process of the household. This implies that the family consid-
ers the conditional cash transfer as non-wage income. The labor supply from
each family member is shown in the equations 6,7 and 8, where the superscript *
denotes the optimum.
(7)
h∗m =
(
αm + αf + αc
αm + αf + αc + βm
)[
Tm − y − wfh∗f − wch∗c − γ + pcct∗cc − θ(Qc)
]
(8)
h∗f =
(
αm + αf + αc
αm + αf + αc + βf
)[
T f − y − wmh∗m − wch∗c − γ + pcct∗cc − θ(Qc)
]
(9)
h∗c =
(
αm + αf + αc
αm + αf + αc + βc
)[
(T c − cec)− y − wmh∗m − wfh∗f − γ + pcct∗cc − θ(Qc)
]
These equations show how the labor supply of each family member is related
to the labor supply of the other members; thus, if any of these members increases
their optimal labor hours, the other family members can reduce theirs. The effect
of a non-wage income such as the conditional cash transfer is negative but it has
an indirect effect through the family members labor supply, given the trade-off
between each family members labor supply and the symmetric effect of the cash
transfer, which induces a simultaneous reduction in the labor hours as shown in
equation 10.
(10)
∂hm
∂θ
=
(
αm + αf + αc
αm + αf + αc + βm
)[
−wf ∂h
∗m
∂θ
− wc∂h
∗c
∂θ
− 1
]
The optimum labor supply for each family member can be solved in terms of
the wages and other parameters in the model:
(11)
h∗m =
(αm + αf + αc + βf + βc)
(1− d1)
Tm− d3
wm(1− d1)
[
wfT f + wc(T c − cec) + y − (1− δ)pccT cc − γ + θ)
]
(12)
h∗f =
(αm + αf + αc + βm + βc)
(1− d1)
T f− d4
wf (1− d1)
[wmTm + wc(T c − cec) + y − (1− δ)pccT cc − γ + θ]
(13)
h∗c =
(αm + αf + αc + βf + βc)
(1− d1)
(T c−cec)− d4
wc(1− d1)
[
wmTm + wfT f + y − (1− δ)pccT cc − γ + θ
]
If a family receives the CCT θ, c must take the value of 1, given the conditions
to receive this benefit. This equation implies that the CCT must be greater than
the wage income lost by the child to reduce the parents labor supply. If the CCT
cannot recover this lost income, both parents have to increase their optimum
labor hours.
III. Data
The data used in this paper ccme from the evaluation survey of FA, which was
particularly designed particularly to measure the impact of the program. The
survey collected information from households located in treatment and control
municipalities between 2002 and 2005. The baseline survey was collected in 2002.
The first round after the baseline was collected in 2003, and the second round
was collected in 2005. The surveys contain information on a wide range of vari-
ables, including the socio-demographic household structure, housing conditions,
education and health variables for household members, household consumption,
labor supply, income, and transfers.
For the purposes of this analysis, we used a module on time-use data that
contained information of the time each household member older than 10 years
allocates to each of the 6 activities during the day before the interview. These ac-
tivities were classified into different categories: market work, domestic work and
schooling. Market work is defined as paid work or work in their own business;
domestic work is defined as household chores without a payment; and schooling
is defined as time attending school and activities related to study. We excluded
from the sample individuals interviewed on a Sunday or a Monday, because time-
use patterns over the weekend are likely to be different from time-use patterns
during the week, particularly for children attending school. Given that the refer-
ence period (one day) is short, we could expect a certain bias on the individuals
allocation of time to each activity.
The survey also has a module on time use after school for children older than
seven years conditional on attending school at the moment of the survey. We used
these data to test for a substitution/complementary relation between child work,
domestic labor, and schooling. Then, these data offered a unique opportunity to
identify the effect of the program on children already attending school and the
complementary relation between schooling and other activities.
The final data set used for estimation purposes consists of 21,197 individuals in
5767 eligible poor households, with time-use variables for three years, including
pre-treatment data. In this sub-sample, the average household size is approxi-
mately seven members, and all households have members younger than 18 years
old. The average age of the household head is on average 46 years old, and the
average level of education is incomplete primary school for the household head
and complete primary school for all other family members.
Table 1—Summary Statistics, Control Variables
Mean (Y=1) Mean (Y=0) Difference P-value
Age 29.799 29.958 0.159 0.495
Sex 0.499 0.488 -0.011 0.124
Family 6.732 6.643 -0.089 0.015
Literacy 0.809 0.806 -0.002 0.669
Education 3.306 3.394 0.088 0.000
Teens by family 6.424 5.964 -0.460 0.000
Kids by family 1.212 1.058 -0.154 0.000
Elderly by family 0.293 0.321 0.028 0.001
Income per capita 53,394 62,182 8,787 0.000
Education Household head 2.656 2.661 0.005 0.821
Female Household head 0.160 0.149 -0.010 0.042
Age Household head 45.323 46.604 1.282 0.000
married hhead 0.847 0.850 0.003 0.604
Rooms 2.033 1.990 -0.043 0.000
inadequate housing 0.326 0.295 -0.031 0.000
inadequate services 0.195 0.206 0.010 0.065
Educative necessity 0.038 0.074 0.036 0.000
Overcrowding 0.515 0.531 0.016 0.022
Dependency 0.561 0.532 -0.029 0.000
Occupied 0.404 0.410 0.006 0.400
Table 1 compares mean values of observable household and individual charac-
teristics for treatment and control sub-samples at the baseline. A T-test shows
difference between the means with most of the observable dimensions included.
A. Time Use of Adults and Children
In this section, we provide a general description of the labor market activities
and time use of the treatment and control groups prior to the implementation of
the program by gender/age groups. Table 2 shows the labor force participation
of women and men by age group reported during the baseline survey. Participa-
tion in each activity is measured by binary variables indicating the individuals
who spend more than one hour on each specific activity. As we can observe,
communities where FA operates are characterized by very high labor market par-
ticipation rates in paid work for men and very low labor market participation
rates for women. Women have a higher participation rate in domestic labor in all
age groups. Participation in school is very similar for girls and boys.
Table 2—Labor force participation prior to the program, percentages
Sex
Female Male Total
10-17 years Work 7 21 15
Domestic 63 41 51
Study 66 58 61
18-60 years Work 32 72 51
Domestic 88 26 59
Study 4 3 3
Older than 60 years Work 23 63 46
Domestic 82 28 51
Study 7 4 5
Table 3 shows the daily hours spent by adults in paid and domestic work. On
average men spend five hours on paid work and less than two hours on domestic
labor. On the contrary, women spend five hours on average on domestic labor
and a little less than two hours on market work. Individuals older than 60 years
spend on average 2 hours per day on domestic labor and 2.5 hours on market
work. We observe the same specialization of men in market work and women in
domestic labor that we found for labor force participation (see Table 2).
Table 3—Time allocation of adults, number of hours
Treatment
Control Treatment Total
18-60 years Sex Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE
Hours of paid work Female 1.31 (0.06) 1.46 (0.07) 1.37 (0.04)
Male 4.85 (0.09) 4.56 (0.10) 4.73 (0.06)
Total 2.99 (0.06) 2.88 (0.06) 2.94 (0.04)
Hours of domestic labot Female 4.74 (0.06) 4.96 (0.06) 4.84 (0.04)
Male 0.54 (0.02) 0.79 (0.03) 0.64 (0.02)
Total 2.75 (0.04) 3.05 (0.05) 2.88 (0.03)
Older than 60 years
Hours of paid work Female 0.66 (0.14) 0.45 (0.13) 0.56 (0.10)
Male 3.42 (0.30) 2.99 (0.26) 3.22 (0.20)
Total 2.24 (0.19) 1.91 (0.17) 2.09 (0.13)
Hours of domestic labot Female 3.93 (0.22) 3.81 (0.23) 3.88 (0.16)
Male 0.67 (0.09) 0.79 (0.10) 0.72 (0.07)
Total 2.06 (0.13) 2.07 (0.13) 2.06 (0.09)
B. Time Use of Children
Child labor is a major problem in Colombia. According to the FA evaluation
survey, an estimated 15% of children between the ages of 10 and 17 years were
working at the moment of the survey and not attending school. Children tend
to begin their labor force participation at early ages, on average at the age of 14
years, to contribute to family income levels.
Child wages are very low relative to those of adults, and most children receive
no health or unemployment benefits. One of the principal objectives of FA is to
increase child enrollment in and attendance at school and thereby reducing this
early labor force participation of children
Table 4—Time allocation of children, number of hours
Treatment status
Sex Control Treatment Total
Hours of paid work 10-13 years Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E
Female 0.05 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01)
Male 0.22 (0.04) 0.19 (0.04) 0.20 (0.03)
Total 0.15 (0.02) 0.11 (0.02) 0.13 (0.02)
Hours of paid work 14-17 years
Female 0.31 (0.07) 0.14 (0.05) 0.24 (0.05)
Male 1.16 (0.10) 1.00 (0.11) 1.09 (0.07)
Total 0.81 (0.07) 0.64 (0.07) 0.74 (0.05)
Hours of domestic labor 10-13 years
Female 1.27 (0.05) 1.23 (0.05) 1.25 (0.03)
Male 0.67 (0.03) 0.91 (0.04) 0.78 (0.03)
Total 0.94 (0.03) 1.06 (0.03) 1.00 (0.02)
Hours of domestic labor 14-17 years
Female 1.81 (0.09) 2.06 (0.09) 1.92 (0.06)
Male 0.69 (0.04) 0.97 (0.06) 0.81 (0.04)
Total 1.15 (0.05) 1.43 (0.05) 1.27 (0.04)
Hours of School 10-13 years
Female 3.60 (0.10) 4.54 (0.11) 4.03 (0.08)
Male 3.40 (0.09) 4.11 (0.11) 3.71 (0.07)
Total 3.49 (0.07) 4.32 (0.08) 3.86 (0.05)
Hours of School 14-17 years
Female 2.99 (0.14) 3.55 (0.16) 3.23 (0.11)
Male 2.39 (0.11) 3.15 (0.14) 2.71 (0.09)
Total 2.63 (0.09) 3.32 (0.11) 2.92 (0.07)
Time-use data of children who attend school are available for children between
7 and 17 years old; however, we report statistics for children between 10 and
17 years old to make the data comparable to the overall measure of time use.
Participation in paid work, domestic work, and leisure time activities after school
is reported in Table 5, and the mean number of hours spent on each activity is
reported in Table 4. Older children and boys spend more hours in market labor
than younger children and girls. However, children who attend school spend most
of their time on school-related activities and domestic activities (Table 6 ).
Table 5—Labor force participation of children conditional on attending school
Treatment status
Sexo Control Treatment Total
10-13 years Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E
Female 0.60 (0.27) 0.53 (0.26) 0.56 (0.19)
Male 2.16 (0.47) 2.14 (0.51) 2.15 (0.35)
Total 1.44 (0.28) 1.35 (0.29) 1.40 (0.20)
14-17 years
Female 1.37 (0.61) 1.93 (0.78) 1.63 (0.49)
Male 3.37 (0.88) 7.89 (1.38) 5.53 (0.81)
Total 2.44 (0.55) 5.21 (0.85) 3.74 (0.49)
Table 6—Domestic labor participation of children conditional on attending school
Treatment
Sexo Control Treatment Total
10-13 years Mean S.E Mean S.E Mean S.E
Female 58.88 (1.70) 58.29 (1.79) 58.60 (1.23)
Male 36.19 (1.54) 48.49 (1.77) 41.73 (1.17)
Total 46.71 (1.17) 53.28 (1.26) 49.75 (0.86)
14-17 years
Female 61.26 (2.55) 74.28 (2.48) 67.26 (1.81)
Male 34.62 (2.33) 47.89 (2.56) 40.95 (1.74)
Total 47.05 (1.79) 59.77 (1.87) 53.03 (1.30)
IV. Empirical Model
As usual in non-experimental data, the impact evaluation of a program such
as conditional cash transfers cannot be estimated by the simple mean differences
of the outcome between treatment and control groups, or in this case, the time
use for labor, study and domestic activities. In addition to the program, there
are other factors that directly affect this outcome. If we do not control for these
factors, the results would be biased. To obtain unbiased estimations, the best
approach is to recreate a randomized experiment, which is by construction in-
dependent from these factors. This approach implies that the treatment status
must be independent from any factor (covariate) T⊥Xj , n = 1, 2, ..., n
(14) ATE = E[Y 1|T = 1]− E[Y 1|T = 0]
In this research, we find unbiased estimates of the effects of the program by pre-
processing our data set with matching methods to obtain an appropriate covariate
distribution across the treatment and control groups. Following Rosenbaum Ru-
bin (1983), balancing the covariates when more than one covariate is involved
requires conditioning the propensity score, which is defined as follows:
(15) P (x) = Prob(T = 1|X1 = x1, X2 = x2, ..., Xn = xn)
Assuming T⊥Y 1, Y 0|P (x)
where T = 1 when the unit is in the treatment group and 0 if the unit is in
the control group, and Xn stands for all the possible covariates involved. By
conditioning with the propensity score, we are able to construct a counterfactual
to E[Y 1|T = 0] that is independent from all covariates. We match the sample
between treatment and control units using the Mahalanobis algorithm.
(16) E[Y 1|T = 1, P (x)] = E[Y 1|T = 0, P (x)]
Thus, we can estimate the average treatment effect as follows:
(17) ATE = E[Y 1|T = 1, P (x)]− E[Y 1|T = 0, P (x)]
A. Control Variables
We use a variety of different variables at the individual and household level to
include all possible factors that could affect the treatment status and the time
use of each individual for a proper estimation as shown in Equation (17). The
parametric estimation of the propensity score includes all variables described in
the summary table.
V. Results
The estimation of P (x) was made by using a probit model where the depen-
dent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the individual is under
treatment and 0 otherwise. The result of this estimation provides a good bal-
ance to the estimation in Figure 1. Both distributions overlap each other with a
small difference considering that the probabilities of being in a municipality under
treatment are concentrated in higher values of the distribution than in the other
distribution. However, we ignore the 5% of the data in the tails of the distribution
to ignore the spurious matching that can be generated between the data in the
tails of both distributions.
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The estimation results for time use in labor hours are shown in Table 7. In
the unrestricted model (when we take all individuals of the sample), there is no
significant difference between the treatment and the control groups. Thus, we can
consider that the total hours offered by a family remains constant (without in-
cluding children younger than 10 years old). However, disaggregating the sample,
we can see that the biggest effects of the CCT are concentrated in the population
that is actually working; the reduction in labor hours offered by the treatment
group, particularly males, is remarkable
Table 7—Estimation Results (Labor Hours)
Average
ATT T-stat
Treated(Y = 1) Control(Y = 0)
Unrestricted 3.17 3.19 -0.02 -0.25
Working
Total
Total 6.87 7.26 -0.39*** -3.26
Age ≥ 18 6.93 7.19 -0.26** -1.98
Age < 18 6.53 7.37 -0.83*** -2.90
Female
Total 6.03 6.43 -0.40 -1.63
Age ≥ 18 6.04 6.33 -0.29 -1.14
Age < 18 6.17 6.96 -0.79 -1.08
Male
Total 7.15 7.53 -0.38*** -2.82
Age ≥ 18 7.28 7.48 -0.21 -1.40
Age < 18 6.60 7.41 -0.81*** -2.59
Unemployed
Total
Total 0.67 0.57 0.11∗∗ 1.97
Age ≥ 18 0.79 0.70 0.09 1.15
Age < 18 0.54 0.44 0.10 1.62
Female
Total 0.46 0.40 0.07 1.23
Age ≥ 18 0.57 0.52 0.06 0.76
Age < 18 0.27 0.22 0.04 0.67
Male
Total 1.13 0.93 0.19 1.60
Age ≥ 18 1.81 1.55 0.26 0.96
Age < 18 0.82 0.63 0.19* 1.72
With regard to domestic labor (Table 8), there is no significant difference in the
unrestricted sample. However, again, when we discriminate, we can see that fe-
males and children (except the unemployed ones) have increased their time spent
on domestic labor. The unemployed male population, on the other hand, has
reduced its participation in these activities.
Table 8—Estimation Result (Domestic Hours)
Average
ATT T-stat
Treated (Y = 1) Control (Y = 0)
Unrestricted 2.83 2.93 -0.11 -1.35
Working
Total
Total 1.27 1.17 0.10 1.38
Age ≥ 18 1.33 1.28 0.05 0.63
Age < 18 0.93 0.54 0.39*** 3.22
Female
Total 3.44 2.96 0.48*** 2.67
Age ≥ 18 3.61 3.23 0.38** 1.98
Age < 18 2.37 1.28 1.09*** 2.62
Male
Total 0.48 0.50 -0.01 -0.31
Age ≥ 18 0.47 0.55 -0.08 -1.45
Age < 18 0.56 0.36 0.20** 2.16
Unemployed
Total
Total 3.89 4.04 -0.15 -1.30
Age ≥ 18 5.83 6.18 -0.34** -2.15
Age < 18 1.85 1.75 0.10 1.04
Female
Total 5.41 5.55 -0.14 -1.03
Age ≥ 18 6.89 7.18 -0.29* -1.79
Age < 18 2.87 2.64 0.24 1.44
Male
Total 0.86 1.00 -0.15* -1.70
Age ≥ 18 0.97 1.47 -0.50** -2.46
Age < 18 0.82 0.84 -0.02 -0.22
The impact on study hours (table 9) has a notable effect on the working popu-
lation, which has increased its time spent on studying. This result shows that the
program is achieving its major objective of reducing child labor and increasing
school attendance. There are no significant effects on the unemployed population,
except for adult females. However, in this population, the study hours of children
are already high, indicating that children are already attending school. Thus, the
program has a small effect.
Table 9—Estimation Results (Study hours)
Average
ATT T-stat
Treated (Y = 1) Control (Y = 0)
Unrestricted 1.62 1.58 0.04 0.69
Working
Total
Total 0.10 0.04 0.06*** 2.95
Age ≥ 18 0.04 0.01 0.03** 2.27
Age < 18 0.45 0.22 0.23* 1.69
Female
Total 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.93
Age ≥ 18 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.26
Age < 18 0.69 0.40 0.29 0.62
Male
Total 0.10 0.03 0.07*** 2.85
Age ≥ 18 0.05 0.01 0.04*** 2.89
Age < 18 0.41 0.16 0.25* 1.76
Unemployed
Total
Total 2.54 2.47 0.08 0.89
Age ≥ 18 0.15 0.10 0.05 1.32
Age < 18 4.67 4.49 0.18 1.48
Female
Total 1.97 1.92 0.05 0.45
Age ≥ 18 0.10 0.03 0.07*** 2.73
Age < 18 4.78 4.70 0.08 0.45
Male
Total 3.62 3.52 0.10 0.64
Age ≥ 18 0.37 0.47 -0.10 -0.66
Age < 18 4.58 4.38 0.20 1.16
VI. Conclusions
The estimates presented in this study provide some evidence on the effecto of
the CCT prgram in Colombia on intra-household time allocation. The analysis
comprises the intended effects on childrens time use and the potential scope of
unintended labor supply effects among adults, which is particularly relevant given
the increasing coverage of the program across the country. Based on our results,
we prove that the program is effective at increasing schooling for all children,
while reducing income and reducing domestic labor. Using time-use data on the
activities of children after attending school for children enrolled in school before
the program, we find that the effect of the program on schooling is mainly a price
effect and that the income effect of the program on children already enrolled in
school is insignificant. We also observe some patterns of substitution between
activities for children attending school as a result of the program. We find that
the program increases the leisure time of boys while reducing their paid work but
reduces the leisure time of girls while increasing their domestic labor.
The study also examines the effect of the program on adults time use. The most
surprising result is the increased labor supply of adults in the program. Partic-
ularly, we find that males increased their paid work at the expense of domestic
labor and that females increased their domestic labor at the expense of leisure
time. Neither economic theory nor previous evidence explains such a behavior.
We provided some explanations because this effect was robust across several spec-
ifications. First, the income elasticity of leisure may be very low for extremely
poor households. This explanation is realistic because the estimated effect of the
FA subsidy in our different estimations, when statistically significant, is negative
and relatively low. Second, the positive impact of CCT programs on childrens
school attendance might free time that was previously spent on childcare, further
reducing the cost of work for adults (Baker, Gruber and Milligan, 2005). If hours
on labor markets between males and females are substitutes and hours of work
between girls and female adults are complementary, as our estimates suggest, this
explanation is very plausible. There are other reasons that might help explain
why there have not been large disincentives to adults labor supply associated with
CCT programs; however, these reasons do likely not likely apply to our program
or need further research to be proven. First, for some households, the reduction
in income from child work and the increase in school expenditures associated
with the additional school enrollment might offset the transfer amount (Fiszbein,
Schady, Ferreira, Kelleher, Olinto and Skoufias, 2009). We assume this possibility
does not apply to our sample, because the average household transfer is almost
equal to the average child income; however, we might need to test for increased
schooling costs. Second, it is possible that adults would not change their labor
supply if the households perceived the transfers to be temporary rather than per-
manent (Fiszbein et al., 2009). We believe this assumption is not very probable
in this case as FA has continuously been expanded since its implementation in
2002, and the government has promoted FA as a permanent program for the
poor. Finally, it is possible that the program has brought changes to wages in
the market, changing work incentives. For the purpose of this analysis, we have
assumed that the program has not affected market wages.
Nonetheless, it is recommended that future research analyzes the potential gen-
eral equilibrium effects of the program, which could have important consequences
for the interpretation of the effects of the program on different outcomes. This
research provides relevant results for our understanding of labor markets in gen-
eral and of how families respond to public interventions such as CCT programs in
particular. The results have large implications for economic policy, because intra-
household time allocation is crucial to comprehend the income-generation process
of the poor and to assess the overall well-being of the program beneficiaries.
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